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The ESLS pre-dated 9/11 and did not account for increased flight hours due to homeland defense air patrols and the war in Afghanistan. Usage rates increased from the ESLS-reported figure of 308 hours per year to 435 hours. 10 Concerned, the Joint Requirements Oversight
Council in October 2001 validated a mission needs statement (MNS) for a new refueling aircraft, making the Air Force the lead. 11 A month later, the Air Force signed the final MNS. Referencing the never-completed Air Force's Tanker Requirements Study, the MNS stated there was an immediate need for new tankers.
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Despite increased KC-135 use and a validated need, new tankers had a lower budget priority within the Air Force. The F-22 fighter program took precedence, and the C-17 was in production. 13 There were not enough funds for another aircraft program. The Air Force had to find another solution-one fitting within the available budget.
Industry Engages
In February 2001, Boeing proposed selling thirty-six 767-based tanker variants to the Air Force to replace the KC-135. 14 The offer was at odds with the KC-135 longevity recommenda- and with Japan that December. 16 While the Air Force was interested in a KC-135 replacement, it did not have the necessary procurement funds in 2001 and did not pursue Boeing's offer.
September 11 was a turning point for many in the defense community, and the budget was no exception. Defense budgets went from famine to feast almost overnight as a culture of vulnerability permeated U.S. society. On September 10, 2001, Aviation Week, in an article titled "Economic Uncertainty Dogs Defense Buildup, " described how President Bush's request for more defense spending was getting pushback from the Hill. "Many of my colleagues believe your request is excessive, " said Senator Daniel K. Inouye (D-HI), Defense Appropriations Subcommittee Chairman. 17 The tide changed after 9/11. In October 2001, the House Appropriations Committee Chairman Bill Young (R-FL) "told National Journal News Service after the meeting that the lid 'is pretty much' off Defense spending and conceded that the nation is back to deficit budgets because of the new war. " He stated that the budget would likely increase from the $317.5 billion just passed unanimously by the House to at least $337 billion. 18 He was off by $10 billion. The final defense appropriations bill was $329.9 billion not including emergency supplementals, which raised it to $347.7 billion. 19 While the defense budgets were going up in the aftermath of 9/11, the commercial airline industry, from carriers to suppliers, was going down. Based on the decline in the market, Boeing announced a plan to lay off 30,000 employees. 20 This situation created coinciding interests between the Air Force and Boeing. The Air Force had a validated need for new tankers, and
Boeing needed to keep the 767 production line going. The primary limitation was a lack of nearterm procurement funds.
There are conflicting reports as to where the lease idea started. Was it the Air Force, Boeing, or Congress? According to a former staffer, Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK) contacted the Air Force shortly after September 11 and asked for "a proposal using 'creative funding' to acquire new Boeing aircraft to replace part of the aging KC-135 air-tanker fleet. " 21 Circular A-11, the items cannot be purchased at the end of the lease period, and the lease price cannot exceed 90 percent of the fair market value. 35 While the OMB allowed lease-purchase agreements, these required full funds in the current year to avoid incremental funding. 36 By using an operating lease, the Air Force could pay for the tanker year by year, effectively circumventing full-funding rules. While the operating lease allowed for more flexible funding options, it was not as flexible regarding aircraft configuration. An operating lease mandated Boeing supply the aircraft in a commercial configuration. In-flight refueling modifications, such as a refueling boom, required another appropriation not included in the budget. At the end of the lease, 
EADS Engages
While the Air Force considered how to execute a leasing strategy, EADS developed a strategy to counter Boeing. It began by publicly requesting an opportunity to bid on the contract rather than allowing a sole-source decision to go forward. EADS implied a sole-source award amounted to little more than a government subsidy for the industry. In order to determine if the lease would cost less than 90 percent of fair market value, the Air Force had to determine the fair market value. The Air Force developed two estimates, and the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) developed a third independent estimate. Determining the estimates was difficult due to the proprietary nature of commercial aircraft pricing wherein both the seller and buyer sign nondisclosure agreements regarding the aircraft purchase prices.
This was further complicated by the commercial item procurement strategies. Since the tanker was supposed to be a commercial item, Boeing was not required to provide detailed pricing data. Lacking data, the Air Force relied on a combination of Boeing estimates, commercial
Internet prices, Italian tanker costs, and costs of similar programs. 44 For its first estimate, the Air Force included the interest on Boeing's financing for aircraft manufacture and calculated the fair market value at $138 million (FY02 dollars). At this value, the Air Force lease was 89.9 percent of fair market value. By removing the financing charge, the Air Force's second estimate of fair market value dropped to $131 million, increasing lease costs to 93 percent and exceeding the operating lease limit. 45 IDA developed the third estimate using commercial pricing for the green aircraft and internal cost analysis models with consultation from vendors, the Air Force, Putting aside the question of the fair market value, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche declared that the lease gave his Service an opportunity to take advantage of a downturn in the commercial aircraft industry to get a deal on its tankers. As the debate went on, many questioned whether the Air Force was getting a deal or bailing out Boeing. If there was a downturn in the market, was the 90 percent lease rate "bargain pricing"? According to testimony from a commercial leasing company executive, 90 percent was higher than typical lease rates for commercial aircraft. 48 Using commercial rates, the Air Force lease "would range from $59 million to $95 million per aircraft per 6-year lease, or about 35 to 57 percent of its value. " 49 A Congressional Research Service (CRS) report speculated the Air Force was trying to get as close as possible to 90 percent to make it cheaper to buy the tankers at the end of the lease.
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If the Air Force purchased the aircraft at the end of the lease, leasing would be even less financially attractive than procurement with the same end result. Since many believed the Air
Force did plan to buy the tankers, the difference between purchasing upfront versus at the end of the lease period became even more relevant. According to the Air Force lease proposal, the total lease price for 100 planes including military construction and operations and support costs was $17.2 billion. 51 This analysis assumed the Air Force did not keep the tankers, but it did not include the cost of removing tanker modifications. GAO estimated that removing modifications would cost the Air Force $778 million. 52 According to the Air Force report to Congress on the lease, a traditional procurement would cost $17.1 billion, which was only $150 million cheaper. 53 The cost difference increased to $900 million if the Air Force used a multiyear procurement strategy. 54 If the Air Force decided to purchase the tankers at the end of the lease, the lease costs would increase to $19.9 billion. 55 CRS found the Air Force's comparison calculations were very sensitive to assumptions such as interest for Boeing's construction insurance and the SPE bonds, insurance, inflation, and expenditure schedule for traditional procurement. If the assumptions were changed, procurement would be even more favorable than a lease, swaying the calculation by as much as $200 million per change in assumption. 56 The Air Force did not dispute that leasing was more expensive than procurement. In addition to citing a lack of near-term procurement funds, it argued traditional procurement would take 5 to 10 years to field a tanker urgently needed now. 57 According to the Air Force, the wartime urgency of need justified the additional expense of a lease. 
Lease Execution Cancelled
After all the debate and compromise over requirements, cost, and lease versus purchase, the final blow to the lease agreement was ethical misconduct associated with hiring a former government employee. The misconduct resulted in a media outcry, a move by the Defense Department to suspend the lease contracting process pending an internal investigation, and more inquiries from Senator McCain. A separate investigation by the Department of Justice led to the prosecution of two former Boeing executives. By the end of the year, the lease was over. Before continuing with the program, DOD IG proposed that the Air Force resolve two key issues regarding the commercial item procurement approach and lack of acquisition strategy. The first issue was the Air Force decision to use a commercial item procurement strategy.
DOD IG disagreed with the Air Force interpretation qualifying the tanker as a commercial item. While based on a commercially available aircraft, the tanker had no commercial market.
Without commercial market forces to ensure "reasonable prices, " the Air Force approach placed "the Department at high risk for paying excessive prices and profits. " 80 The second issue was the lack of an acquisition strategy. They wanted the Air Force to develop an acquisition strategy in accordance with "best business practices" and "prudent acquisition procedures. " 81 Rather than developing an acquisition strategy, the Air Force used Section 8159 of the Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY02 as the basis for an informal acquisition strategy that "cannot ensure to the warfighter that the delivered KC-767A Tanker aircraft will satisfy operational requirements. " 82 Stemming from these issues, DOD IG had an extensive list of recommendations requiring the Air Force reconsider the entire acquisition approach. For example, DOD IG determined the tanker lease did not meet the operating lease requirements and recommended the Air Force receive approval for a lease-purchase or change the lease to meet the operating lease terms. 83 The Air Force disagreed with the report, but it was too late to save the program.
Lease proponents in Congress lost the fight, and congressional support was gone. (1) the modification of the general purpose aircraft from the commercial configuration, unless and until separate authority for such conversion is enacted and only to the extent budget authority is provided in advance in appropriations Acts for that purpose; or (2) the purchase of the aircraft by, or the transfer of ownership to, the Air Force.
(e) The authority granted to the Secretary of the Air Force by this section is separate from and in addition to, and shall not be construed to impair or otherwise affect, the authority of the Secretary to procure transportation or enter into leases under a provision of law other than this section.
(f) The authority provided under this section may be used to lease not more than a total of 100 Boeing 767 aircraft and 4 Boeing 737 aircraft for the purposes specified herein. 
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